

DCI ADDRESS TO THE FBI FIDELITY CLUB

WASHINGTON, D.C.

9 May 1978

Thank you very much Bill. Members of the Fidelity Club, ladies and gentlemen. When Vern approached me some months ago about whether I could be with you tonight, I gave him a very instant yes, because there is little that is higher on my program than ensuring a continuation of the fine teamwork, the find relationships that exist between the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency. Now that's really the end, the punchline of my speech, but I'm giving it to you at the beginning because its the only important thing I have to say.

In the year and a quarter that I've been here, I've seen nothing but good cooperation and I've developed nothing but admiration for the FBI people I've been privileged to work with. I had a very good relationship with Clarence Kelly and I'm very grateful to him. There was no one in the government bureaucracy who did more personally to welcome Pat and myself to Washington than did Clarence and we are very, very grateful and we'll always remember that. As your present Director has just said, he and I have had a mutual admiration and friendship that goes back further than I would have admitted, but he was very frank with you. I believe that this opens up for us now opportunities for continuing and expanding the cooperation, the exchanges, the defense of our country, that our two organizations must do

in collaboration. Of course, our agencies have a natural affinity for each other because we have so many ties in common, and we have so much history together; long records of marvelous contributions to our country. Long records of individual self-sacrifice in behalf of our country. And perhaps, unfortunately, in recent years a common complaint of having been pilloried frequently and improperly in the public media of our country. This has been difficult for both of us, a shared difficult experience, because in our business frequently we have been mis-accused and yet have been unable to rise to our own defense for reasons of security. We have in common seen how the transgressions of a few in our professions have tarred the many. We've seen how much more difficult it is when you have the pride and the record of accomplishment that our organizations do, to have accusations against our morale, against our spirit. In other ways, the trials and tribulations that we have gone through together have, I think, some salutary benefits, there is some silver lining in most every cloud. They have forced us to self-questioning, self-examination, which has been helpful I am sure. They've encouraged us to learn and to grow from the mistakes of the past and to ensure that we don't let a few misrepresent us or cause us problems in the future. But most of all, I think they've helped us clarify our objectives and our goals and to understand just a little better where each of our organizations fit in the society of our country. And perhaps the most dramatic example that I could talk to you

about tonight is how the CIA is finding its place in our society, is in our new policy of openness, of sharing more with the American public. And here we have much to learn from you in the FBI.

Traditionally the CIA and intelligence in our country in general has operated under maximum secrecy and minimum disclosure. I don't believe, however, that any public agency of our government can thrive, can persist unless it has a basic support in the American public. Now for all these years until just recently, that support did exist for the Central Intelligence Agency. It existed on faith, the country was willing to accept the obvious need for a good intelligence service and to trust that we were doing it the way they wanted. After these some three years of public inquiry and criticism, that's simply no longer the case and the Central Intelligence Agency, in my view, if it is going to survive and it's going to do its job as it certainly must for our country's good, must have some form of public support. Here you're well ahead of us with your public tours, your radio, your television shows and other means of communicating with the public in which you have, over the years, built wonderful support and understanding in the American public. You have already grappled with the difficult issue that we face in our professions of combining openness with necessary secrecy. It's clearly a difficult task but one that I believe in our democratic society must be achieved. The CIA, on the other hand, has not done this in the past and

when we were in trouble few people knew our side of the story, few people understood. But the contributions of the past have been and, therefore, deserved some forgiveness if there have been problems in the present. People couldn't put our present problems in perspective of past accomplishments. So today we're moving more toward your model of reasonable openness combined with absolutely necessary secrecy where it has to be.

For instance, we are publishing more of the product of the Central Intelligence Agency. We are taking studies, estimates, and after the National Foreign Intelligence Board approves them (and they're classified), we go back and we look at them and we say, if we take out those things which must be kept secret, particularly those things that tell how we got our information, will it still be of value to the American public. Will it help enhance the quality of American debate. If it does, we publish it. Similarly, we are today responding more openly, more forthrightly to the media when they come and ask us questions. For the first time we even have a public affairs officer at the Central Intelligence Agency. That's something of a joke because we did have a public affairs officer for many years, but the one who had the job a few years ago is now under cover overseas. I'm not quite sure how you manage that, but this time we have a professional public affairs officer who isn't ever going to need to find cover. We're out speaking in public more. I don't consider this a public speech, this is a matter of talking with the family, but I do get out and our people are

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getting out more. Our analysts who are on the open side of the house are attending more conferences, more academic meetings and discussions. We're trying to put our best foot forward, we're trying to share with the American public and give them some feeling of return on their dividends; but, at the same time, bank a little credit, bank a little understanding that we're in the risk taking business, and when you're in the risk taking business, you're not always going to make them right. You are going to be criticized and that's part of our job. But I think we have to have built up some understanding so that when we call a risk that doesn't pay off or somebody else second guesses us when it's over with, people do understand the kind of things we have to do and the fact that our records are so good that we deserve some credit even when we maybe blow one from time to time.

In finding, as you have, the balance between openness and secrecy, we are drawing a very firm line at discussion of sources of collecting intelligence or methods of collecting intelligence, just as I am sure you do very resolutely. We simply don't extend our public affairs program into that area, talking about our clandestine activities, our necessary operations in order to collect intelligence. Now clearly in an openness policy in either of our organizations, there is a risk that you're going to disclose too much or you are going to start down that slippery slope where you say one thing and it leads to another and you know how the news media can egg

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you on. On the other hand, I happen to believe today in the intelligence business at least, that disclosing as much as we can of what we have learned, what our estimate and our product is, will in fact, help protect us against a leak of what must remain classified. Let me explain. I think the greatest danger, the greatest source of leaks today of classified information is the abundance, the over-abundance, of classified information within our government process. In short, people do not respect the classified label anymore because there are so many of them around. I hope that reducing the corpus of total classified information, that we can garner the respect that is deserved by that which remains. I don't know if it will work, but I certainly think that if we do not get that greater respect that we must have for the secrets that our country must keep, we're going to be in serious trouble in times ahead. And I say to you that I'm very grateful for the efforts that you make on all of our behalf in catching and bringing to prosecution those people who do deliberately leak information and/or conduct espionage operations against our country. We're grateful to you for the conviction last year of two young men in Los Angeles who conducted espionage operations in an intelligence contractor facility. We're grateful for the fact that there are two people on trial here in this city today for conducting espionage in Washington. We must continue to pursue all reasonable leads and bring to prosecution those who are guilty in these areas or this trend, this sense that people are doing a great thing by revealing information is going to

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bring us into a state of chaos. The Bernsteins, the Woodwards have done important things for our country, but you cannot just carry that principle on until every one of the 215 million people in our country has the right to determine what should be kept classified and what should not. That would lead to sheer chaos.

Clearly we must not reopen the specter of Watergate and of using classified information as a way of hiding things from the public if the public deserves to know. But I feel today that in the way we are evolving in the oversight process of both of our activities, there is good insurance for the American public against such abuse. We're both being pushed more and more into the oversight mechanisms. We have greater attention today by our President, our Vice President, of both of our activities. We have greater attention throughout the Executive Branch, particularly from the Attorney General. We have an Intelligence Oversight Board created within the Executive Branch and, of course, we have two intelligence oversight committees of the Congress, one in each chamber. Now there are benefits and there are risks in all of this additional oversight from what we had before. Sometimes I think we as the operators who now have to deal with this mechanism, will now have to report to more people, now have to crank out more papers, we tend to forget the benefits in light of the risks, in light of the problems that it creates. We're not accustomed to this in either of our businesses. But let me suggest that when you are subjected

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to this process of oversight, it engenders throughout your entire organization a greater sense of accountability and while I would suggest there have been transgressions by the few in the past at the cost of the many, it has often been because there wasn't adequate accountability within the organization. The oversight process makes everyone more acutely aware of that and the more we are aware of it inside, the less there will be for the oversight to have to oversee.

Another benefit of the present oversight process is that it, in fact, shares some of the responsibilities that you and I have to take and the burdens we have to carry. Although we often don't like to admit it, there is sometimes a real benefit from somebody coming in and looking at our operations from the outside and saying, Hey Turner, don't you see those woods over there, all you've been looking at is the trees, you've missed the big picture. Finally, I would say that oversight through the Congress has the benefit of keeping us in closer touch with the American public and at such times as the rules change, the attitudes of what the country wants from your organization and mine become different, and the attitudes and outlooks are different with respect to our activities, we'll be closer attuned to it because we're keeping in touch through the oversight process with the Congress of the United States. But let me not minimize the other side of the story because clearly there are risks. There

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are risks that are becoming more and more obvious as we settle down into this process of overmanagement, of people not understanding the fine line between oversight and over-management, asking for too much detail wanting to check ahead of time, check too much specificity and so on. I see this as a process that we're going to be working out over the next year, or two perhaps, as the charters for the intelligence community, including the FBI, are written and delineated by the Congress. But I'm hopeful, I'm optimistic, I think with time and with the considerable understanding that I see developing on the part of the members of these Congressional committees that we will be able to find the right line between oversight and management.

There is also risk that this oversight process will lead us into undue timidity; timidity because you're going to have to disclose so much and discuss so much with your oversight processed the risks of leaks. Now most of the leaks in the oversight process can be much more dangerous to us than can the average leak of somebody going to a bar and talking with a newspaper man in an indiscreet way. What I am saying is that if you're going to have oversight, you and I are going to have to discuss something of how we go about our business, what our methods really are; not everything about them, but enough about them to give the oversight people a reasonable chance of understanding our processes. The greatest danger of leaks almost always comes from exposures of our sources and our methods of doing business. So, there is particular danger in

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the oversight process here, whether it's in disclosing the sources of intelligence collection, the technical methods and systems of intelligence collection, or many of your law enforcement processes and sources. I happen to believe that the probability of something leaking that shouldn't goes up geometrically with the number of people who know it, regardless of whether they are Congressmen or FBI agents or CIA officers or anybody else in any position whatsoever. I have no particular evidence today that the oversight process in the Congress has led to any particular leaks or any particular problems. I certainly have been able to identify more problems and leaks on the part of some of the past employees of the Central Intelligence Agency. You know from reading the paper almost any day. I think there are also leaks simply from the process I've just mentioned, overzealous people speaking when they should be listening, trying to be too much of a hero in some public form when they should be discreet.

I would particularly like to mention my very deep personal concern today, that there are leaks about the sources and methods of our doing our businesses through penetration, through undermining of our government by foreign intelligence services. I think number one on my hit parade of concerns as Director of Central Intelligence, is ensuring that we are building between the FBI and the CIA the adequate defense in counterintelligence that this country must have. The defense of this country must have at a time when I need not remind you

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that our vulnerability is probably greater than it ever has been since World War II. The time when the other side has more opportunity to find openings, to find weaknesses, to find people whom they can suborn inside our society. We must be very conscious of this and here teamwork between your organization and mine is absolutely essential. I would say to you in the candor of this family gathering that too often in looking at past histories that come up to me of counter-intelligence operations, I find that my people say, well we didn't tell all of that to the FBI; or, on this side they say, the FBI didn't let us know about what was going on over here. I would suggest to you that we must have full, complete exchange and cooperation in this counterintelligence field today. Probably nowhere else is it so important that each of us has some external scrutiny on what we are doing; each of us has someone on the outside bringing cold objectivity to bear on our counterintelligence activities. Only thus can we be ready to hand off to each other when the problem goes from the United States to overseas or vice versa, and only thus can we be sure that the same body of data is given a different look, a different sense of where are the woods as opposed to the trees, so that we don't get caught up in believing that we know everything just because we've been working with it closely ourselves. I think double-checking, double-looking at each other's activities here is very important.

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Let me announce to you at this time that just two days ago I appointed a new Director of Counterintelligence in the Central Intelligence Agency. [REDACTED] the present director, is retiring this summer of his own volition. I have searched for some months through the entire Central Intelligence Agency looking for the best man to replace him, because I felt that this spot at this time needs more attention than any other. I have actually deprived another branch in one of its key spots--the key analyst in the entire Middle East situation in the world today which is as you know so critical to our country. I pulled a man named [REDACTED] one of our most senior, highly respected, broadly experienced officers, out of that assignment in the critical Middle East area, to take over in a short time our counterintelligence function. I'm sure some of you know him, I see Bill nodding his head, and I know that he's going to be the kind of a man with whom you can work and I picked him in large measure because I thought that that was the kind of person that would best be suited to ensure the teamwork between our respective organizations. I feel so strongly about this that in addition, I have taken the man who was a special assistant on my personal staff and I have given him a designation as a special representative to keep me informed of counterintelligence activities across the entire community. I don't want to get isolated in my front office and not really know what's going on in counterintelligence across the entire United States

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government. I'm counting on these two men to be a big help in building and continuing the teamwork between our organizations in this critical field.

While I'm asking for your support and help here, let me say one last thing where I think you can also be of help to us. And that is in giving attention to the spillover benefit in collecting foreign intelligence while you're about your counterintelligence business. I happen to feel very strongly today that we cannot afford to risk expensive and dangerous overseas intelligence collection operations when the information can be gained in much less costly ways. We're emphasizing more the open collection intelligence here inside the United States through our Domestic Collection Division offices in liaison with American business and so on. We're emphasizing more the marvelous intelligence we gain by sharing with the State Department their overseas information and experiences. We're emphasizing more the thorough scrubbing of open literature to make sure we understand all we can from that. And we'd like to emphasize more keeping in close touch with you to ensure that you are abreast of what we need, what we are looking for in the foreign intelligence field, so that you can give us clues and tips and information that you derive in the process of going about your business, and that we can then follow up and grind into that human computer or sometimes a real computer, that helps us pull the pieces of the puzzle together. You never know which piece is going to be the critical one.

We have so much to do together. I'm so grateful that I have the opportunity of doing it in conjunction with your new director. I think our friendship, our respect for each other opens up even greater opportunities than the traditional warm, cooperative relations that have existed between our agencies. I pledge to you Judge Webster my full cooperation in what I think can be important steps ahead for the safety and security of our country.

Thank you.



April 24, 1978

Honorable Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Admiral Turner:

This relates to my letter of December 28, 1977, concerning your appearance at the May 9, 1978, meeting of the FBI Fidelity Club. It pleases me to mention that Director William H. Webster and Associate Director James B. Adams also will be in attendance. Consequently, the Fidelity Club membership, and many others who plan to join us, look forward to a memorable evening.

Our meeting will be held at the Sheraton National Motor Hotel, 900 South Orme, Arlington, Virginia, telephone 521-1900. It is my understanding the Hotel is located close to the Washington Boulevard Exit of Interstate 395 South. A social hour will begin at 6:00 p.m. and dinner will be served at 7:00 p.m. If I may assist you or your staff in any way, please contact me at 324-4609.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Vernon H. Weimar".

Mr. Vernon H. Weimar
Intelligence Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Headquarters
Washington, D.C. 20535



December 28, 1977

Executive Registry
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Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Admiral Turner,

Thank you for accepting our invitation to be the guest speaker at the May 9, 1978, meeting of the FBI Fidelity Club.

As I mentioned during our discussion of December 21, 1977, The Fidelity Club is comprised of FBI personnel who are members of the Masonic Fraternity. Our meetings, however, are open to all employees who wish to share with us a delightful dinner, fellowship, and the informative and interesting presentations of our distinguished guests. In May, 1978, we will celebrate our 29th anniversary; therefore we are most pleased the occasion will be highlighted by your presence.

I will be in contact with you, or your staff, sufficiently in advance of May 9th to perfect details as to time and place. In the interim my colleagues and I extend our very best wishes to you for the New Year.

Sincerely yours,

Vernon H. Weimar

Mr. Vernon H. Weimar
Intelligence Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters
Washington, D. C. 20535

Public Office

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Routing Slip

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED] /Herb Hetu
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Address to Fidelity Club, FBI May 9th

Mr. Vern Weimar, our FBI Liaison Officer, came to see me on the 21st. He asked me to talk to the Fidelity Club of the FBI - some sort of a fraternal group within the organization. I agreed to do so on May 9th. Vern will confirm by letter.

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[REDACTED]
STANSFIELD TURNER

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cc: [REDACTED]

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